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Adequate assessment of (un)consciousness
is not only of theoretical interest but also
has a practical and ethical importance,
especially when it comes to disorders of
consciousness (DOC). Accurately deter-
mining the presence or absence of con-
sciousness in patients with DOC allows
informed decisions to bemade about long-
term care support, referral for rehabilita-
tion, pain management and withdrawal of
life support.
In spite of significant progress in
neuroimaging and the introduction of
clear-cut clinical diagnostic criteria,
determining the (un)consciousness still
presents an important clinical problem:
errors are common and have been shown
to be as high as 37–43% (Tresch et al.,
1991; Childs et al., 1993; Andrews et al.,
1996; Schnakers et al., 2006).
Assessment errors arise because the
evaluation of patients with DOC is based
mostly on clinical observation of sub-
jectively interpreted behavioral responses,
while conscious experience often occurs
without any behavioral signs. Additionally
behavioral responses of such patients are
usually limited by their cognitive dys-
functions and/or by their frequent motor
impairment. Therefore, determining if a
non-communicative or minimally com-
municative patient is phenomenally con-
scious poses a major clinical and ethical
challenge. For this reason, there is a need
for paraclinical diagnostic markers for the
presence or absence of consciousness.
We believe that a theoretical account of
what conscious experience is and how it
emerges within the brain will advance the
search for appropriate neuromarkers of
the presence or absence of consciousness
in non-communicative brain-damaged
patients.
In our view, several important
considerations need to be kept in mind:
CONSCIOUSNESS vs. VIGILANCE
Consciousness is often conceptualized as
a phenomenon with two components:
wakefulness and awareness (Posner et al.,
2007). Though such understanding is
currently quite wide-spread, it confuses
and mixes two different and independent
phenomena: subjective awareness and vig-
ilance. While awareness is an important
component of consciousness, wakeful-
ness belongs to the vigilance domain.
Independence of these two concepts
can be demonstrated by examples from
a daily life: (a) we are able to uncon-
sciously perform complex actions like
brushing our teeth or driving a car while
being completely awake; (b) being at the
same level of wakefulness we are usu-
ally aware of some events/stimuli while
unaware of others; and (c) during sleep
we can be aware of our phenomenal
experience (dreams) but are not awake.
Hence, wakefulness is not a compo-
nent of consciousness but of vigilance.
Vigilance, however, affects consciousness
by limiting the amount of information
available for conscious access (Rusalova,
2006), thus affecting the amount of
content (Overgaard and Overgaard,
2010).
IS CONSCIOUSNESS GRADUALLY
CONTINUOUS OR DISCRETE
(“ALL-OR-NONE”)?
From the abovementioned fallacy,
another misconception arises—levels
of consciousness. The assumption is
that consciousness itself can be some-
how diminished (less consciousness) or
increased (more consciousness), and thus
considered to be gradual (Laureys et al.,
2002; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010a).
However, there is no introspective evi-
dence to support this widely accepted
idea (Overgaard and Overgaard, 2010).
Indeed, from a third-person perspective,
consciousness presents itself in varying
amounts, depending on the level of vig-
ilance of the studied subject. However,
what is important is that from the first-
person perspective one is either discretely
fully aware or unaware of something. It is
the amount of content that varies grad-
ually (Overgaard and Overgaard, 2010).
There is no additional degree of con-
sciousness during such awareness of the
content (for a discussion see Fingelkurts
et al., 2012a). In other words, con-
sciousness is not merely a quantitative
matter of a degree but in fact a quali-
tative matter of absence or presence of
a particular state (Plum et al., 1998). In
this sense, when consciousness is sep-
arated from arousal/wakefulness, then
it is more of a categorical (all-or-none)
phenomenon rather than a continuous
(gradual) one (Fingelkurts et al., 2012a).
It is the degree of vigilance (wakeful-
ness) that conflates the expression of
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consciousness, resulting in an illusion of
its continuous or graded nature (Hudetz,
2010).
WHAT IS THEN CONSCIOUSNESS?
It is reasonable to assume that to
be conscious is to be in a particular
state which has projections onto men-
tal/ psychological, neurophysiological
and cognitive/behavioral dimensions
(Edelman, 1989; Sokolov, 1990; Flohr,
1991; Tononi, 2008). Currently we do
not know all parameters of this state,
but recent empirical studies have pro-
vided several important observations (see
Figure 1):
• The realization of a particular state of
consciousness requires particular level
of vigilance [and hence a preservation
of the autonomic nervous system (Plum
and Posner, 1980; Wijnen et al., 2006)],
a corresponding functional state and
physical integrity of the brain (Pistoia
and Sara, 2012).
• A given conscious state should have a
particular duration: it must be longer
than the time it takes for the sim-
plest cognitive act to be completed,
which is on the order of several hun-
dreds of milliseconds (Pöppel, 1997;
Geissler et al., 1999; VanRullen and
Koch, 2003). It seems that duration
less than this threshold makes a state
un-conscious (still mental domain)
or non-conscious (non-mental neuro-
physiological domain) (for a discussion
see Fingelkurts et al., 2010; Bagnato
et al., 2013).
• It seems that the state of consciousness
is supported by medium values of such
characteristics of neuronal assembles as
their functional size, life span and sta-
bility (Figure 1). Indeed, consciousness
is lost when neuronal assembles’ size,
life span and stability decrease as is the
case for patients in vegetative state (VS)
or under general anesthesia (Greenfield
and Collins, 2005; Fingelkurts et al.,
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration relating consciousness expression and
neuronal assembly characteristics. The stepwise line represents the idea
that gradual changes in neuronal mechanisms need to be accumulated to
reach a particular threshold level required for qualitative change in the
functional state (Bagnato et al., 2013). During VS as a result of a brain injury,
the functions of the neural net subtending consciousness (awareness) are
reduced in both hemispheres below the threshold level required for minimal
consciousness expression. The recovery of consciousness is a dynamic
process that involves many plastic changes in many brain structures. If this
reorganization crosses the threshold of the minimal neuronal mechanisms
that are jointly sufficient for any conscious awareness (particular level of the
size, life-span, stability and speed of growth of neuronal assemblies, as well
as the amount and strength of functional connectivity between them), the
patient will regain consciousness (Fingelkurts et al., 2012a,b). The critical
factor regulating the occurrence or absence of consciousness recovery is the
distance of these functional characteristics of neuronal assemblies from this
threshold level (Bagnato et al., 2013).VS, vegetative state; MCS, minimally
conscious state; dashed horizontal line illustrates a threshold of the minimal
neuronal mechanisms that are jointly sufficient for any conscious awareness
to emerge.
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2012b). Likewise, consciousness is lost
when these characteristics are changed
in the opposite direction as in the
case of patients during the general-
ized seizure (Martin, 1991). Curiously,
the speed of the growth of neuronal
assemblies is slow during a conscious
state but it increases significantly when
consciousness is lost (Fingelkurts et al.,
2012b).
• Similarly, both low (like in VS or
general anesthesia) and high (like in
seizure) levels of synchrony among neu-
ronal assemblies result in a dramatic
loss of consciousness (Flohr, 1995;
Mashour, 2004; John and Prichep,
2005; Blumenfeld, 2008; Cavanna
and Monaco, 2009; Hudetz, 2010;
Fingelkurts et al., 2012b) (Figure 1).
• High strength of default mode net-
work synchrony is required to support
representational content integrated
within the first-person perspec-
tive (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010b;
Fingelkurts et al., 2012c).
• The state of consciousness is domi-
nated by EEG fast-alpha and beta oscil-
lations (Fingelkurts et al., 2012a,b,c
see also Gugino et al., 2001; Kuizenga
et al., 2001; Babiloni et al., 2006, 2009;
Rusalova, 2006; Bas˛ar and Güntekin,
2009) that may be considered necessary
and aminimally sufficient neural condi-
tion for a conciseness to be expressed.
• The state of consciousness is indepen-
dent from specialized cognitive pro-
cesses like episodic memory, language,
introspection or reflection, sense of
space, sense of body, sense of self, or
sensorimotor processing, or attention as
it follows from neurological evidence
(for the reviews see Tononi and Laureys,
2008; Boly et al., 2009).
Taken together (Figure 1) these findings
suggest that consciousness is an emer-
gent phenomenon of coherent dynamic
binding of multiple, relatively large, long-
lived and stable, but transient alpha and
beta generated neuronal assemblies orga-
nized as synchronized patterns within a
nested, hierarchical brain architecture. It
seems that these are minimally sufficient
conditions at the more basic level (brain)
that are required for the emergent qual-
ity (conscious mind) to manifests itself.
Indeed, if phenomenal consciousness
is a biological phenomenon within the
confines of the brain, then there must
be a specific level of brain organization
and a specific spatial–temporal grain in
it where consciousness resides. In other
words, we could expect that at the lower
(in comparison with the phenomenal
consciousness) level of brain organiza-
tion there should be non-experiential
entities (some complex electrophysio-
logical mechanisms) that function as the
direct realization base of the phenomenal
world (Fingelkurts et al., 2010, 2013a).
The abovementioned nested hierarchical
architecture of separate and synchronized
neuronal assemblies forms the very partic-
ular level of brain functioning, so-called
operational architectonics level, which on
the one hand intervenes between phys-
ical level of the brain where it literally
resides, and on the other, is isomorphic
to the experiential/subjective phenomenal
structure of the mind (Fingelkurts et al.,
2010). In other words, the level of the
operational architectonics has emergent
properties relatively independent from
the neurophysiological/neuroanatomical
properties of the physical level. And the
phenomenal level supervenes on this
operational level with one-to-one cor-
respondence thus making it ontologically
inseparable from it (though it is separable
from the brain neuroanatomical processes
through the operational level) (Fingelkurts
et al., 2013a).
ANALYTIC MODEL FOR ASSESSING
CONSCIOUSNESS
Patients in VS or in minimally con-
scious state (MCS) offer a unique oppor-
tunity to study the neural basis of
(un)consciousness due to the fact that
impairment in awareness of self and envi-
ronment is dissociated in such patients
from preserved and stable wakefulness. We
believe that an appropriate level of con-
sciousness description should articulate
the operational level of brain organization
where the phenomenal/conscious phe-
nomena reside (Fingelkurts et al., 2013b).
Electroencephalogram (EEG) is a suit-
able and adequate measure for the instru-
mental analysis of such operational level,
because it (a) provides a direct (in con-
trast to indirect fMRI an PET) measure
of the behavior of large-scale neuronal
networks with a millisecond temporal
resolution and reflects functional proper-
ties and states of brain functioning as well
as being closely connected to information
processing in/among neuronal assemblies
(for a discussion see Fingelkurts et al.,
2012a) and (b) enables clinicians to assess
spontaneous brain activity at each level of
vigilance and in any state of consciousness,
bypassing the need to elicit a behavioral
or any other response from the patient
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010b).
Following Baars’s (1988) recommenda-
tion, an experimental analytic model for
the assessment of consciousness should
consider only those EEG parameters that
satisfy the rule: (i) NORM ≥ MCS > VS
for subjective awareness of self and envi-
ronment, (ii) NORM ≥ MCS < VS for
subjective unawareness of self and envi-
ronment. This model was already suc-
cessfully used in several recent studies
(Fingelkurts et al., 2012a,b,c, 2013b).
In conclusion we argue that in the sit-
uation where there is no consensus on
what would constitute the reliable mark-
ers of consciousness in the absence of
the subject’s report, a theory-based insight
into neural substrates and mechanisms
involved in conscious content may be use-
ful for detecting the presence of con-
scious experiences in non-communicating
subjects.
DOWE NEED A THEORY-BASED
ASSESSMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS
FOR PROPER REHABILITATION OF
PATIENTS WITH DOC?
On the basis of the foregoing concepts,
we may assume that patients with similar
clinical behavior (i.e., VS or MCS) differ
considerably in their level of operational
architectonic dysfunction and that in turn
translates into different expression of con-
sciousness (Fingelkurts et al., 2012b). This
is a critical point, if we consider that
chances of recovery from a DOC (partic-
ularly, from a VS) depend on the interac-
tion of two main factors: (i) the degree of
impairment of neuronal systems support-
ing consciousness, and (ii) the amount of
spontaneous and rehabilitation-induced
plastic changes aimed to restore brain
functions and connectivity within nested
operational architectonics (Bagnato et al.,
2013). If so, the precise measurement
of brain dysfunction characteristics will
be decisive, as it will allow rehabilitative
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treatments to be tailored for each patient.
In the future, we may test the effectiveness
of specific interventions (i.e., cognitive
rehabilitations, drugs or neurostimula-
tion) in patients in VS or MCS by evalu-
ating the effects of the treatments on the
patients’ neuronal assembly characteristics
mentioned earlier. We will then be able to
choose the best rehabilitative intervention
(or a suitable combination of treatments)
for each patient with severe DOC by taking
in consideration neurophysiological mark-
ers that are easily quantifiable at any stage
of rehabilitation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Dmitry
Skarin for English editing.
REFERENCES
Andrews, K., Murphy, L., Munday, R., and Littlewood,
C. (1996). Misdiagnosis of the vegetative state: ret-
rospective study in a rehabilitation unit. BMJ 313,
13–16. doi: 10.1136/bmj.313.7048.13
Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of
Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Babiloni, C., Sarà, M., Vecchio, F., Pistoia, F.,
Sebastiano, F., Onorati, P., et al. (2009). Cortical
sources of resting-state alpha rhythms are abnor-
mal in persistent vegetative state patients. Clin.
Neurophysiol. 120, 719–729. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.
2009.02.157
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Miriello, M., Romani, G.
L., and Rossini, P. M. (2006). Visuo-spatial con-
sciousness and parieto-occipital areas: a high-
resolution EEG study. Cereb. Cortex 16, 37–46. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhi082
Bagnato, S., Boccagni, C., Sant’Angelo, A.,
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., and
Galardi, G. (2013). Emerging from an unrespon-
sive wakefulness syndrome: brain plasticity has to
cross a threshold level. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev.
37, 2721–2736. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.
09.007
Bas˛ar, E., and Güntekin, B. (2009). Darwin’s evo-
lution theory, brain oscillations, and complex
brain function in a new “cartesian view.” Int.
J. Psychophysiol. 71, 2–8. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.
2008.07.018
Blumenfeld, H. (2008). “Epilepsy and consciousness,”
in The Neurology of Consciousness, eds S. Laureys
and G. Tononi (Oxford: Elsevier Academic Press),
247–260.
Boly, M., Massimini, M., and Tononi, G. (2009).
“Theoretical approaches to the diagnosis of altered
states of consciousness,” in Coma Science. Clinical
and Ethical Implications Progress in Brain Research
177, eds S. Laureys, N. D. Schiff, and A. Owen
(Amsterdam: Elsevier), 383–398.
Cavanna, A. E., and Monaco, F. (2009). Brain mech-
anisms of altered conscious states during epilep-
tic seizures. Nat. Rev. Neurol. 5, 267–276. doi:
10.1038/nrneurol.2009.38
Childs, N. L., Mercer, W. N., and Childs, H.W. (1993).
Accuracy of diagnosis of persistent vegetative state.
Neurology 43, 1465–1467. doi: 10.1212/WNL.43.
8.1465
Edelman, G. M. (1989). The Remembered Present. A
Biological Theory of Consciousness. New York, NY:
Basics Books.
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., Bagnato, S.,
Boccagni, C., and Galardi, G. (2012a). EEG
oscillatory states as neurophenomenology of con-
sciousness as revealed from patients in vege-
tative and minimally conscious states. Consc.
Cogn. 21, 149–169. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.
10.004
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., Bagnato, S.,
Boccagni, C., and Galardi, G. (2013b). “The value
of spontaneous EEG oscillations in distinguish-
ing patients in vegetative and minimally con-
scious states,” in Application of Brain Oscillations in
Neuropsychiatric Diseases (Supplements to Clinical
Neurophysiology), eds E. Basar, C. Basar-Eroglu,
A. Ozerdem, P. M. Rossini, and G. G. Yener
(Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V.), 81–99.
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., Bagnato, S.,
Boccagni, C., and Galardi, G. (2012b). Toward
operational architectonics of consciousness: basic
evidence from patients with severe cerebral
injuries. Cogn. Process. 13, 111–131. doi: 10.1007/
s10339-011-0416-x
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., Bagnato,
S., Boccagni, C., and Galardi, G. (2012c).
DMN Operational synchrony relates to self-
consciousness: evidence from patients in vegetative
and minimally conscious states. Open Neuroimag.
J. 6, 55–68. doi: 10.2174/1874440001206
010055
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., and Neves, C.
F. H. (2010). Natural world physical, brain oper-
ational, and mind phenomenal space-time. Phys.
Life Rev. 7, 195–249. doi: 10.1016/j.plrev.2010.
04.001
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., and Neves, C.
F. H. (2013a). Consciousness as a phenomenon
in the operational architectonics of brain orga-
nization: criticality and self-organization consid-
erations. Chaos Solitons Fractals 55, 13–31. doi:
10.1016/j.chaos.2013.02.007
Flohr, H. (1991). Brain processes and phenome-
nal consciousness. a new and specific hypothesis.
Theory Physiol. 1, 245–262.
Flohr, H. (1995). An information processing theory of
anaesthesia. Neuropsychologia 9, 1169–1180. doi:
10.1016/0028-3932(95)00056-9
Geissler, H.-G., Schebera, F.-U., and Kompass, R.
(1999). Ultra-precise quantal timing: evidence
from simultaneity thresholds in long-range appar-
ent movement. Percept. Psychophys. 61, 707–726.
doi: 10.3758/BF03205540
Greenfield, S. A., and Collins, T. F. T. (2005). A
neuroscientific approach to consciousness. Prog.
Brain Res. 150, 11–23. doi: 10.1016/S0079-6123
(05)50002-5
Gugino, L. D., Chabot, R. J., Prichep, L. S., John,
E. R., Formanek, V., and Aglio, L. S. (2001).
Quantitative EEG changes associated with loss
and return of consciousness in healthy adult vol-
unteers anesthetized with propofol or sevoflu-
rane. Br. J. Anaesth. 87, 421–428. doi: 10.1093/bja/
87.3.421
Hudetz, A. (2010). “Cortical disintegration mecha-
nism of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness,”
in Suppressing the Mind: Contemporary
Clinical Neuroscience, eds A. Hudetz and
R. Pearce (New York, NY: Humana Press),
99–125.
John, E. R., and Prichep, L. S. (2005). The anesthetic
cascade: a theory of how anesthesia suppresses
consciousness. Anesthesiology 102, 447–471. doi:
10.1097/00000542-200502000-00030
Kuizenga, K., Wierda, J. M. K. H., and Kalkman,
C. J. (2001). Biphasic EEG changes in relation
to loss of consciousness during induction with
thiopental, propofol, etomidate, midozalam, or
sevoflurane. Br. J. Anaesth. 86, 354–360. doi:
10.1093/bja/86.3.354
Laureys, S., Antoine, S., Boly, M., Elincx, S.,
Faymonville, M.-E., Berre, J., et al. (2002). Brain
function in the vegetative state. Acta Neurol.
Belg. 102, 177–185. doi: 10.1007/978-0-306-485
26-8_21
Martin, J. H. (1991). “The collective electrical
behaviour of cortical neurons: the electroen-
cephalogram and the mechanisms of epilepsy,” in
Principles of Neural Science, 3rd Edn., eds E. R.
Kandel, J. H. Schwartz, and T. M. Jessell (London:
Prentice–Hall International), 777–791.
Mashour, G. A. (2004). Consciousness unbound:
toward a paradigm of general anesthesia.
Anesthesiology 100, 428–433. doi: 10.1097/
00000542-200402000-00035
Overgaard, M., and Overgaard, R. (2010). Neural
correlates of contents and levels of conscious-
ness. Front. Psychol. 1:164. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2010.00164
Pistoia, F., and Sara, M. (2012). Is there a cartesian
renaissance of the mind or is it time for a new tax-
onomy for low responsive states? J. Neurotrauma
29, 2328–2331. doi: 10.1089/neu.2009.1257
Plum, F., and Posner, J. B. (1980). The Diagnosis of
Stupor and Coma. Philadelphia, PA: F.A. Davis
Company.
Plum, F., Schiff, N., Ribary, U., and Llinás, R.
(1998). Coordinated expression in chronically
unconscious persons. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond.
B Biol. Sci. 353, 1929–1933. doi: 10.1098/rstb.
1998.0345
Pöppel, E. (1997). A hierarchical model of tempo-
ral perception. Trends Cogn. Sci. 1, 56–61. doi:
10.1016/S1364-6613(97)01008-5
Posner, J. B., Saper, C. B., Schiff, N. D., and Plum, F.
(2007). Plum and Posner’s Diagnosis of Stupor and
Coma, 4th Edn. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Rusalova, M. N. (2006). Frequency-amplitude char-
acteristics of the EEG at different levels of con-
sciousness. Neurosci. Behav. Physiol. 36, 351–358.
doi: 10.1007/s11055-006-0024-x
Schnakers, C., Giacino, J., Kalmar, K., Piret, S., Lopez,
E., Boly, M., et al. (2006). Does the FOUR score
correctly diagnose the vegetative and minimally
conscious states? Ann. Neurol. 60, 744–745. doi:
10.1002/ana.20919
Sokolov, E. N. (1990). Neurophysiological mecha-
nisms of consciousness. Zh. Vyssh. Nerv. Deyat. 40,
1049–1052.
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated infor-
mation: a provisional manifesto. Biol. Bull. 215,
216–242. doi: 10.2307/25470707
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 402 | 4
Fingelkurts et al. Theory-based assessment of consciousness
Tononi, G., and Laureys, S. (2008). The neu-
rology of consciousness: an overview,”
in The Neurology of Consciousness, eds S.
Laureys and G. Tononi (Oxford: Elsevier),
375–412.
Tresch, D. D., Sims, F. H., Duthie, E. H., Goldstein, M.
D., and Lane, P. S. (1991). Clinical characteristics
of patients in the persistent vegetative state. Arch.
Intern. Med. 151, 930–912. doi: 10.1001/arch-
inte.1991.00400050078015
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q., Tshibanda, J.,
Bruno, M. A., Boveroux, P., Schnakers, C., et al.
(2010a). Default network connectivity reflects
the level of consciousness in non-communicative
brain damaged patients. Brain 133(Pt 1), 161–171.
doi: 10.1093/brain/awp313
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q., Tshibanda,
L. J.-F., Bruno, M.-A., Boveroux, P., Schnakers,
C., et al. (2010b). Default network connectivity
reflects the level of consciousness in non-
communicative brain-damaged patients. Brain
133, 161–171. doi: 10.1093/brain/awp313
VanRullen, R., and Koch, C. (2003). Is perception dis-
crete or continuous? Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 207–213.
doi: 10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00095-0
Wijnen, V. J., Heutink, M., van Boxtel, G. J., Henk,
J., Eilander, H. J., and de Gelder, B. (2006).
Autonomic reactivity to sensory stimulation
is related to consciousness level after severe
traumatic brain injury. Clin. Neurophysiol.
117, 1794–1807. doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2006.
03.006
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence
of any commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential conflict of
interest.
Received: 14 March 2014; accepted: 19 May 2014;
published online: 04 June 2014.
Citation: Fingelkurts AA, Fingelkurts AA, Bagnato S,
Boccagni C and Galardi G (2014) Do we need a theory-
based assessment of consciousness in the field of disorders
of consciousness? Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:402. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00402
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, Bagnato,
Boccagni and Galardi. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the
original publication in this journal is cited, in accor-
dance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribu-
tion or reproduction is permitted which does not comply
with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 402 | 5
